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Attorneys Fees, Offsets and Priorities
by Roger Bernhardt*

In Behniwal v. Mix, 147 Cal App 4th
621, a 2007 California decision, purchasers prevailed in their action for
specific performance of a contract, to
purchase the vendors' residence. Since
there had 'been three trials and appeals
of this matter, and since there was an
attorneys' fees clause in the contract,
the trial court awarded the purchasers
$250,000 attorneys' fees and offset it
against the $540,000 purchase price
that they owed. The court of appeal
'held that this offset was error, for reasons that might cause surprise to most
attorneys, although lenders' counsel
might be glad to learn of them.

onsets v. Priorities
First, the. court held that the right of
offset is subject to the law of priorities, meaning that a party to a lawsuit
cannot automatically assert a right of
offset - even ifhe otherwise entitled to
one - if that would be inconsistent with
the rules of lien priorities. Normally, if
A owes B $100 and B owes A another
$100, the two debts offset each other
so that A does not have to pay B the
$100 that she owes him. But, Behniwal
held that if B has other claimants to
that money whose interests in it are
determined to be superior to A's claim,
then A may have to pay B - despite
the fact that she is at the same time
owed money by B, in order to be fair
to C, B's superior claimant. In this
case, the sellers only asset was their

house, on which three liens (two of
them mortgages) had recentlymaterialized, which made A's having to pay B
so that C could collect would lead to A
being unable to enforce her offsetting
debt from B.
I think most attorneys would have
predicted the opposite result, i.e. they
would have assumed that the law of
offsets prevailed over the law of priorities, because many cases often treat
an offsetting debt as having already
been paid, pro tanto (as if the purchasers in Behniwal had already actually paid $250,000 of the $540,000
price to the sellers). But this decision
said no, at least as far as California
goes. Compare that with Chapman v.
Olbrich, 217 SW3d 482, a Texas case
also decided just this year, that seems
to be minded to go the other way. Can
you predict what the outcome would be
in your state?

Priority Against Other Claims
Second, the court held that the plaintiffs' attorneys' fee claim came in
fourth - behind a $238,000 deed of
trust given by the sellers to World
Savings Bank, two other deeds of
trust totaling $70,000 given to their
attorneys, and a homestead exemption (equal to $150,000) recorded by
the sellers on their residence. Since
all three of those interests arose after
the plaintiffs had filed their specific
performance action, how did they

achieve higher priority than the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees claim?
The court held that the reason the'
attorneys' fees claim came in last was
because it constituted only tn ordinary
money judgment that did not take
effect until it was awarded, entered,
and then recorded. Since none of that
could happen until the end of the trial,
the three rival claims against the sellers
had priority of it because they had all
been recorded prior to that date.
I think most attorneys would have
again predicted the opposite result, i.e.
they would have assumed that since the
decree of specific performance related
back to the inception of the lawsuit, the
award of attorneys fees would therefore do the same, as an incident of that
decree, instead of being characterized
as a separate money judgment with an
independent and later priority, as this
case held. Relation back priority is
often true for an attorney's lien on an
award to her client for fees the client
owed to her (see, for instance, Mahesh
v. Mills, 607 NW2d 618, Mich., 1999),
but that is different from the claim of
contractual attorney's fees sought by
the client against the other party.
If the fees do not themselves relate
back, then neither I) the fact that the
first deed of trust was taken with constructive notice of the lawsuit (because
of a recorded lis pendens, discussed
next), nor 2) the fact that the deeds

* ACMA member Professor Roger Bemhardt is Editor of the California Real Property Law Reporter. Members interested
in seeing his forthcoming National Mortgage Law Newsletter, send requests to Rbernhardt@GGU.edu. '

10

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1789808

of trust given to the sellers' attorneys
were undoubtedly taken with actual
knowledge of the litigation (after all,
the attorneys were defending it), and
was probably for services to be rendered in the case, like a future advance
arrangement, nor 3) the fact that. the
homestead declaration was recorded
by the sellers after the filing of the
lawsuit against them which was based
upon a sales contract which included
an agreed on attorneys' fees clause in
it, mattered, since the ordinary money
judgment for attorneys fees was riot
(and could not be) recorded until after
all of that happened. Notice or knowledge of what is held to corne beneath
you does not put it in front of you. So
all of the rival creditors prevailed.
This was a California decision. Do
you know what your state would say
on this priorities question? What do
you tell a litigation minded client
about the risk that his adversary may
subject the property that he is trying
to acquire to liens which can destroy
the value of the attorneys' fee clause
in the contract? How do you describe
the risk to a potential lender who sees
a lis pendens on property that he is
being asked to finance?

The Lis Pendens and
Relation Back
Third, the court held that the lis pendens - recorded at the very outset of
the litigation - did not give the purchasers any superpriority over the three
competing liens. It gave notice only of
their attempt to pursue specific performance and thereby have to pay the
price to the vendors; it did not give
notice of a further claim for attorneys
fees, because that has no relationship
to the issues of title or possession of
the property in issue, which is what

a California lis pendens is all about.
Title ordered by the decree of specific
performance would relate back to the
date of filing the lis pendens, but not
the money awarded to pay the victorious plaintiff's attorneys fees.
I think, for the third time, that many
attorneys would have again predicted
the opposite result - we would have
assumed that the title and the price
were sufficiently related as to be tied
together in the lis pendens. See Scott v.
Majors, 980 P2d 214, Utah, 1999. But
Behniwal held that the only response
of a potential lender who saw notice
of a specific performance action would
be that the price paid by a victorious
buyer would be a good substitute for
the title held by the defeated seller if
that happened, and would give that
lender no reason to regard the security
as impaired.

Who Cares?
The winners and losers in this case are
not quite what they might appear to
be. The purchasers prevailed, but they
had to pay the sellers the full $540,000
purchase price, rather than the net
$290,000 the trial court would have
imposed on them. Of that $540,000,
$238,000 will go first to World Savings
Bank, $70,000 will go to the seller's
attorneys, and $150,000 will be protected by the homestead exemption.
Since those claims total $458,000, that
leaves only $82,000 remaining for offset, as against the purchasers' entitlement of $250,000 for their attorneys
fees, or a shortfall of $168,000. The
defeated defendants' attorneys may
have charged less, but seems much
more likely to recover what they were
owed than are the attorneys for the victorious plaintiffs. Let's hope that they
did not also have the case on a contingent fee basis! •
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